Fast and Accurate Vulnerability Analysis of a RISC-V Processor

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Why care about Fault Tolerance?

- Modern technologies
 - Lower node capacitances
 - Denser layouts
 - Increased frequencies
- Energy efficiency
 - Lower supply and threshold voltages



High SET sensitivity

Vulnerability Analysis

- Fault injection, simulation or emulation most often:
 - Only injects single-bit faults
 - Does not model the microarchitecture
 - Ignores combinational logic
- Memory/register fault injection is not enough
 - Need to model microarchitecture
 - Need to consider combinational logic [1]
- New technologies exhibit multi-bit error behaviors
 - Need to model MBUs as well as SEUs

[1] N. N. Mahatme *et al*, «Comparison of Combinational and Sequential Error Rates for a Deep Submicron Process», *IEEE Trans. On Nuclear Science*, Dec. 2011

Contributions

MBUs are present and are here to stay

- Fault injection methodology and flow (Part II)
 - From gate to microarchitecure
 - MBU-aware
 - Fast and accurate

• Use case: Comet RISC-V processor core (Part I)

Part I: Comet a HLS designed RISC-V Core

What You Simulate is What You Synthesize

- Traditional Processor Design Flow
 - Maintain two coherent models:
 - RTL and simulation (ISS) models



What You Synthesize is What You Simulate

- Traditional Processor Design Flow
 - Maintain two coherent models:
 - RTL and simulation (ISS) models

- Proposed Flow
 - Design the processor as well as its software validation flow from a single high-level model



Explicitly Pipelined Simulator (1/2)

- Comet core
 - 32-bit RISC-V instruction set RV32IM
 - In-order 5-stage pipeline micro-architecture
- Pipelined stages are explicit
- Main loop is pipelined (II=1)
- Explicit stall mechanism
- Explicit forwarding

```
struct FtoDC ftodc:
struct DCtoEx dctoex;
struct ExtoMem extomem;
struct MemtoWB memtowb:
while true do
   ftodc_temp = fetch();
   dctoex temp = decode(ftodc);
   extomem_temp = execute(dctoex);
   memtowb_temp = memory(extomem);
n);
   writeback(memtowb);
   bool forward = forwardLogic();
   bool stall = stallLogic();
   if !stall then
                                            -----
       ftodc = ftodc_temp;
       dctoex = dctoex temp;
       extomem = extomem_temp;
       memtowb = memtowb_temp;
   end
   if forward then
       dctoex.value1 = extomem.result:
   end
                                                   8
end
```

Explicitly Pipelined Simulator (2/2)



struct FtoDC ftodc; struct DCtoEx dctoex; struct ExtoMem extomem; struct MemtoWB memtowb; while true do ftodc temp = fetch(); $dctoex_temp = decode(ftodc);$ extomem_temp = execute(dctoex); memtowb temp = memory(extomem); writeback(memtowb); bool forward = forwardLogic(); bool stall = stallLogic(); if *!stall* then ftodc = ftodc_temp; dctoex = dctoex temp;extomem = extomem_temp; memtowb = memtowb_temp; end if forward then dctoex.value1 = extomem.result; end end

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Design and Validation Flow



What about quality of the hardware?

Synthesis Results

- Target technology is STMicro 28nm FDSOI
- All cores are configured for rv32i

AREA AND FREQUENCY RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT RISC-V CORES.

Core	Language	Frequency	Area (μm^2)
		Target (MHz)	
Comet [1]	C++		8 4 7 6
PicoRV32 [3]	Verilog	700	7 830
Rocket [4]	Chisel		11 764



Advantages and Limitations

Advantages

- Improves readability, productivity, maintainability, and flexibility of the design
- Fast simulation (~20.10⁶ cycles/s)
- Object-Oriented processor model can be easily modified, expanded and verified

Limitations

- Pipeline stages and some features (e.g. multi-cycle operators) have to be explicit
- HLS tools may have trouble synthesizing large multi-core systems...

Part II: Vulnerability Analysis Flow

Proposed Approach to Vulnerability Analysis



1/ Gate-level Analysis



 Inject SETs in the gate-level netlist







• Logging patterns and error probability (SEUs + MBUs)



Results: Comet Execution Stage



1 Million injections

Influence of SET Width and Frequency on MBUs

• Fixed width (400ps)

Freq.	200 MHz	300 MHz	400 MHz	500 MHz	600 MHz
SEU	9,308	15,592	23,613	26,489	30,919
	93%	96.3%	94.1%	94.9%	95.5%
MBU	699	599	1,473	1429	1,447
	7%	3.7%	5.9%	5.1%	4.5%

• Fixed frequency (500MHz)

SET	100 ps	200 ps	400 ps	500 ps
SEU	5,144	10,529	26,489	33,449
	97.6%	95.3%	94.9%	95.9%
MBU	127	755	1429	1,432
	2.4%	4.7%	5.1%	4.1%

2/ Microarchitectural-Level Fault Injection

• Augmented simulator allows for injection of gate-level fault patterns

 Injection is guided by the area of the different pipeline stages

- Fault classes considered:
 - Crashes and Hangs
 - ISM, AOM, ISM & AOM



ISM: Internal State Mismatch AOM: Application Output Mismatch

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Comet Vulnerability Analysis Results

Error class proportions



Standard vs. proposed approach

Conclusion on Vulnerability Analysis

MBUs are present and are here to stay

- MBUs significantly impact AVF
 - more than 50% critical errors (crashes & hangs)
- Fault injection methodology and flow
 - From gate to microarchitecure
 - Conscious of MBU patterns and error probability
 - Fast and accurate

Conclusion & Roadmap on Comet

- Efficient processor core design (HW µarch + SW simulator) from a single C++ code
- Current projects
 - Dynamic Binary Translation, Non-Volatile Processor, Fault-Tolerant Multicore, etc.
- Perspectives
 - Automatic source-to-source transformations for HLS
 - From ISS-like specification to HLS-optimized C code
 - Support for floating point extension
 - RTOS Support (process, interrupt controller, peripherals)
 - Multi-core system with cache coherency (Q4 2019)
 - Many-core system with NOC (2020)

RIOT



Thank you for your attention!



https://gitlab.inria.fr/srokicki/Comet